state's population are members of the same ethnic group. 1 The greater the number of ethnic groups and the more even their relative size, the more fractionalized the population 2 .
An ELF of 0 describes a very homogeneous state and 1 a highly diverse one. A more recent formulation attempts to modify the original 1964 ELF measure by considering the size of the largest and second largest ethnic groups to create a new metric, EF (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 84) . This has been mapped in figure 1.
[ Figure 1 here]
Critically, cultural diversity in the form of language, as measured by the Ethnologue dataset, for instance, must be distinguished from ethnic diversity, which is based on selfidentity measures. Ethnic identity in turn is not coterminous with politically-relevant ethnicity: in some societies, notably in sub-Saharan Africa, ethnicity has an 'onion'-like character, with several different levels, only the highest of which may be politically important (Posner 2005) . Similarly, in North America, 'white' is now politically relevant in a way
Croatian or German is not. Jewish and Mormon, however, remain politically relevant groups despite their size. In order to account for the imperfection of any single fractionalization measure, this paper utilizes a wide range of measures, seeking to evaluate which factors are most closely associated with different forms of ethnic fractionalization across the world's states.
Incumbent upon the pathbreaking work of Easterly and Levine (1997) , Alesina et al. (1999) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) , an extensive literature now exists on the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and political and economic outcomes such as economic Few have turned the question around to ask why some states are more fractionalized than others. Such questions are of more than intrinsic interest. They are also important because it is vital to understand the upstream determinants of the fractionalization which may be producing malign political and economic effects. Moreover, identifying fixed or slowchanging correlates of ethnic fractionalization enables scholars to deploy these measures as bedrock independent or instrumental variables in their analyses. On the other hand, if ethnic fractionalization is at the mercy of faster-moving political and economic modernization factors, then it should properly be viewed as endogenous to modern economic and political change -and therefore less important.
Theories of Nationalism and Ethnic Fractionalization
The three main theories of nationalism -primordialism, ethnosymbolism and modernism -offer competing explanations for the existence of ethnic diversity (Özkirimili 2010) . Primordialism locates ethnicity in universal aspects of human psychology. For primordialists, our evolutionary psychology represents the successful adaptation of humanity to conditions obtaining during prehistoric time. Primary among these is geography.
Geoclimatic isolation of people produces cultural and genetic drift. Genetic distance creates In effect, ethnic boundaries based on genetic and cultural difference preserve the variations incubated in ecological niches. In this manner, geoclimatic explanations for variations in ethnic fractionalization are most closely related to primordialism. An alternative 'geoculturalist' interpretation would claim that geography shapes ethnogenesis via cultural diversity and its usefulness as a group marker, but that this diversity is subsequently amenable to being eroded and reshaped by social processes (Cavalli-Sforza 2001) . This second formulation would predict that while traces of geography's effects may remain in ethnic fractionalization patterns, the two will be more loosely connected than if primordialist assumptions hold.
Critics of primordialism suggest that kin-selection impulses are deflected toward constructed forms of community like teams, religious groups or political nations (Brigandt 2001) . They also reject the primordialist position that ethnicity can exist in small groups, averring that by definition, ethnic communities must involve a larger scale of human community. Bonds therefore need to be culturally imagined rather than merely experienced in the form of face-to-face gemeinschaft relationships (Anderson 1983) . The ethnosymbolist school, for example, concurs with primordialists that ethnic groups predate the modern era, but emphasizes the importance of political and cultural institutions rather than geography.
Ethnosymbolists claim that ethnic groups do not arise until the late neolithic period when writing, religion, recorded history and extra-local mobilization allowed for the formation of communities knit together by 'imagined' bonds of territory, memory and ancestry (Smith 1986: 44-5). Often ethnic consciousness remained the preserve of a small elite, as with the Anglo-Saxon English consciousness of the Venerable Bede and King Alfred (Hastings 1997: 35-9) . Some ethnic groups (i.e. Jews, Amhara, Armenians, Persians) had ancient origins, while many more emerged in the medieval and early modern periods through tribal confederation (i.e. Arabs, Kurds), conquest agglomeration (i.e. Gothic founders of Spain) or dynastic competition (i.e. Scots, Catalans). In all cases, territorial identities extending beyond the locale came to be established (Smith 1986; Armstrong 1982 ).
There are two major forms of ethnicity, according to Francis' (1976: 6) schema:
primary ethnicity, in which members of the group occupy their ancestral 'homeland' territory; and secondary ethnicity, whereby groups acknowledge that they are diaspora and not native, and thus their homeland lies elsewhere. Since immigrants form just 2.7 percent of the world's population, it is primary ethnic fractionalization which is generally captured by ELF and is by far the most important form of fractionalization when it comes to economic development and conflict (Demeny and McNicoll 2006, ch.1) . Most of the premodern entities studied by ethnosymbolists are primary ethnic groups, even if they sometimes spawn secondary offshoots like the Jewish, Parsee and Armenian diasporas.
The appearance of translations of religious texts such as the bible into vernacular languages, and the numerous recorded premodern references to natio, gens and ethnos is cited in favour of the theory (Hastings 1997) . This explains why historians of the medieval period tend to be ethnosymbolists (Zimmer and Scales 2005) . This argument predicts that ethnic identities, once formed, are highly path-dependent and durable. Ethnic sentiments are reproduced by both state and vernacular institutions. The vernacular rootedness of ethnicity means that it is capable of inspiring collective action and resisting 'official' political and identity constructs imposed by the state. Though more culturalist than materialist in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The modernist account contests the ethnosymbolist and primordialist version of events. It argues that premodern identities were strictly local -for the peasant masses, or imperial-religious for military and religious elites (Anderson [1983 (Anderson [ ] 1991 Gellner 1983; Giddens [1985 Giddens [ ] 1996 . Modernity fractures the horizontal ties between cosmopolitan elites, as with Latin Christendom, which fragmented into nation-states with their own vernacular languages. Beneath them, locals were 'invited into history', and came to be connected to wider, self-conscious territorial communities (Nairn 1977) . Print capitalism, mass conscription, mass education, secularization and more intensive transport networks combine to orient local identities toward a common, this-worldly community. Pre-existing cultures are orthogonal to this process, which is driven by political and economic imperatives.
'Nationalism, which sometimes takes preexisting cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates preexisting cultures: that is a reality,' writes Eric Hobsbawm (1990: 10) .
Beyond the majority ethnic identity -created by the new nation-state -shared ethnic identities are forged in modern times through states' internal administrative boundary marking activity. This reflexive demarcation institutionalizes ethnic diversity, as with Soviet
Republics or colonial administrative departments. Divide-and-rule policies by imperial rulers and missionaries contribute to the process (Trevor-Roper 1983; Brass 1991; Brubaker 1996; Wimmer 2002) . Anti-state mobilization by political entrepreneurs, often driven by the imperative to control important industrial resources such as oil, is another vector of ethnogenesis. Ethnic entrepeneurs may have experienced blocked upward mobility within central state structures (Gellner 1983) , or may use ethnic and national movements as a vehicle to acquire more power or wealth than they might through conventional political (Sowell 2011: 317-18) . Others find that the wider the diversity in land quality and topography in a territory, the greater the ethnic fractionalization (Michalopoulos 2012; Sutherland 2003) . Ahlerup and Olsson (2011) add that an early incidence of initial prehistoric human settlement, together with geoclimatic factors, predicts enhanced diversity. States far from mankind's East African origins, such as Sweden, were settled later than equatorial regions, and hence possess less ethnic diversity.
Laitin and Robinson (2011) also advance a geoclimatic argument, applying Jared Diamond's continental axis theory to individual states. They uncover some evidence that linguistic diversity is greater in states characterized by a North-South cartographic skew as compared with those which spread in a more East-West direction.
Historical institutional factors feature in work with the State Antiquity dataset (Bockstette et al. 2002) . This uncovers a significant negative association between ELF and the date of initial state formation coupled with the degree of indigenous control of the state in the ensuing period. The logic is that older states, and those where the indigenous population had greater political control, could spread their culture and identity and are therefore less diverse than newer states -or those ruled by foreigners. However the connection between state history and ethnic fractionalization is a bivariate finding since this relationship was not formerly distinct groups amalgamated into larger ethnic entities based on cultural relatedness (Eriksen 1993: 20-21) . This paper breaks new ground by adopting a comprehensive approach that incorporates geoclimatic diversity, historical indicators, modernization and international determinants. Finally, expanding beyond previous work, it encompasses linguistic, identitybased and politically-relevant ethnic fractionalization measures.
Geoclimatic Variation and Ethnic Fractionalization
The three major theories of nationalism make different predictions regarding the relationship between geography and ethnic fractionalization. Primordialists would view extreme ecological diversity -as in the New Guinea case -as diversity-enhancing. Yet for ethnosymbolism, extreme isolation produces sub-ethnic localism, impeding imagined community. This localism produces disorganization, reducing resistance to the modern state when it eventually penetrates the periphery, and renders the task of nation-building easier than might be the case in a situation where larger ethnic groups have mobilized. However, above a certain threshold -perhaps several thousand in population -an ethnosymbolist would grant that difficult terrain acts to increase the number of competing premodern polities. Rival ethnic identities can take root so long as there are literate intellectuals and institutions that help spread myths, symbols and memories beyond the local. Terrain that permits this mobilization while preventing wider integration is optimal in producing ethnic fragmentation.
Thus more challenging terrain would be expected to lead to greater ethnic heterogeneity, but less so than in the primordialist case.
For modernists, varied terrain acts as a barrier to the state in its quest to homogenize populations and facilitates secessionists' strategy of escaping to peripheral redoubts from which they can construct their interest-reinforcing ethnic projects. For Horowitz, ethnic fusion tends to occur with political amalgamation; fission with political division (Horowitz 1975: 139-40) . Meanwhile, variegated terrain hampers the networks of coordination (Laitin 2007 ) which incentivize participants to join an imagined community. Though ecological variation is associated with greater ethnic fractionalization in all three theories, this relationship would be expected to be stronger under assumptions of primordialism than for competing theories. We can test for this by examining the relationship between a country's geoclimatic diversity and its ethnic diversity.
Thus our first hypothesis: (Smith 1986 ). In most cases, the dominant ethnic group is also largest because popular sovereignty and democratization spread their influence down the social scale and render exclusive dominant minorities like Syria's Alawis rare (Kaufmann and Haklai 2008) . Therefore we may approach the question of ethnic absorption through measures of ethnic and state antiquity. The State Antiquity dataset asks when a polity above the tribal level was founded on the territory of an existing state; whether this was indigenously-controlled or foreign; and further, what proportion of the territory of the present-day state was under native rule. This is determined for every 50-year period since 1 A.D. Different rates of discounting past periods are applied by the authors, with the most common measure being a 5 percent discount every 50 years (Putterman 2007 ).
An alternative approach is to attempt to code the founding date of the largest ethnic group in a state. This serves as a measure of ethnic absorption because older dominant ethnic groups will have had more time in which to assimilate neighbouring or subaltern groups than newer groups. Dominant ethnic groups frequently emerge as assimilationist actorsfractionalization-reducing nuclei -within multi-ethnic states. Connor (1994a: 96) notes that homogeneous nation-states occur in less than 10 percent of the world, but that a substantial majority of states contain an ethnic majority. All but five of 156 countries in Vanhanen's (1999) dataset feature a plurality group of a third or more of the population. In other words, some form of ethnic dominance appears to be nearly universal (Kaufmann 2004) . 
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable consists of seven distinct measures of ethnic fractionalization. These cover a range, from those which tap cultural diversity (but which may not be salient for identity) to those which measure politically-salient constructs (which may consist of supraethnic amalgams). NUMBRLANG, the number of languages in a country as derived from (Wimmer et. al. 2009 ). In between the culturalist and political measures lie those that focus more squarely on ethnic identity:
PLURAL (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and PCTMAJ (Vanhanen 1999) are measures of the share of the population made up of the largest ethnic group. EF, the fractionalization measure used by Fearon and Laitin (2003) , combines information on the size of the largest and second largest ethnic groups, with data on the total number of linguistic groups exceeding 1 percent of the population. A.D. 7 The most likely explanation for this pattern is that the period from 0-1100 A.D. was one in which some of the earliest continuous 'ethnic states' (Smith 1986) , with elite myths of descent and cultural codes, were formed. It encompasses many states which occupy lands captured during the Sunni Arab conquests of the 7th-11th centuries. In addition, a number of durable East Asian kingdoms arose at this time and many West European states emerged out of the Germanic barbarian successor dynasties which replaced the western Roman Empire (see figure 2 ). Confirming, but with caveats: one reason to be skeptical of the superiority of the modernist explanation based on state founding date rather than the ethnosymbolist (ethnic) date measure is that reverse causation is a stronger possibility for state founding date.
Namely, it is highly plausible that a more ethnically fractionalized territory might hinder the formation of a modern state. By contrast, fractionalization prior to state formation is unlikely to affect the founding date of the ethnic group that emerges as the largest in the state.
Modernist theory is more unambiguously supported by the predictive power of oil output per capita, lending support to H 6 . This is a significant parameter in four of seven models, backing 'greed'-based modernist arguments based on ethnic entrepreneurialism (Collier and Hoeffler 1994) . Structural modernization variables offer a mixed picture:
democracy enters just one of seven models and GDP per capita none. Infant mortality rate (not shown) did not approach significance in any specifications. We therefore find little support for H 5 .
Modern political and economic dynamics count for more when it comes to reducing ethnic fractionalization over time. The founding date of the state is significant in several specifications, suggesting that national integration is an important solvent of ethnic bonds. It is also vital to appreciate that this is an analysis of variation between countries rather than time points. The static nature of the dependent variable biases the data against faster-moving predictors, hence these results do not negate the importance of modernizing processes in reducing diversity in time. Predictors of variation between countries at one point in time are often different from those which predict variation within countries over time (Kittel 2001: 233) .
As noted, there is qualified support here for historical institutionalist arguments. The sub-Saharan Africa dummy, the only variable to perform well across all models, partitions fairly evenly into effects related to the volume of historic slave exports per capita and regional effects unrelated to the legacy of slavery. 8 Along with ethnic group founding date effects, this thereby lends some credence to ethnosymbolic approaches. All told, the results are inconclusive in arbitrating between ethnosymbolism and modernism, though both underperform primordialism in the sense that geoclimatic variables are more powerfully associated with all but the politically-relevant measures of ethnic fractionalization.
Other variables, not readily assignable to the three major theories of nationalism, figure prominently in the combined model. Population density in 1995, which springs from geoclimatic, historical institutional and modernist sources, is significant in five of seven specifications, though its sign changes when the dependent variable moves from linguistic to identity-based measures of fractionalization. In general, denser populations are associated with less ethnic fractionalization. This effect persists with a control for population density in 1500 indicating that more recent variation in population growth may underpin this correlation. 9 Larger territories are expected to contain more groups, and this is borne out in the data: land area is significant in three models and signed in the expected direction in all seven. Among other variables unrelated to major theories of nationalism, neither a state's number of historic secessions nor its rule by a historic dominant minority were associated with ethnic fractionalization. This may be because more fractionalized states such as Russia/USSR and Serbia/Yugoslavia are more apt to experience secession such that the two effects negate each other. Finally, the historic era in which states were created is important.
Those which formed prior to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 are most homogeneous, while those emerging during the period of decolonization are most diverse. Importantly however, a term capturing whether a country is an ex-European colony did not reach significance in the model in table 1, though it was important in several more restricted specifications. 10 This questions the general wisdom that colonization, by running roughshod over ethnic boundaries, is primarily responsible for sub-Saharan Africa's high ethnic fractionalization. It seems the ethnically fractionalizing inheritance of slavery plays a more important role in this development, as Nunn (2008) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) surmise.
Finally, states which emerged on the back of nationalist movements defined in ethnic terms (see appendix 3) are somewhat more homogeneous: ethnic nationalism reaches significance in two of seven models, though it is signed in the expected direction in all. This intimates that successful ethnic nationalists partially attain their homogeneous utopias. Their failure to fully realize their dreams probably stems from the fact that most, i.e. Lebanese
Christians, Romanians or Ulster Protestants in the interwar period, bear few qualms about annexing territory populated by other groups (Brubaker 1996) .
Discussion
Why are some countries more ethnically diverse than others? This paper weighs explanations based on geoclimatic, historical and politico-economic factors and concludes that geoclimatic This primordialist thesis must be qualified, however, by noting that geoclimatic variables are not strongly associated with politically-relevant ethnic diversity. This is an important corrective to the existing literature on geographic determinants. Ethnosymbolic legacies from the premodern period also have an important bearing on ethnic fractionalization, though less so than geography. Ethnic group founding date is a weak (inverse) predictor of ethnic diversity, probably because older groups have had longer to assimilate proximal neighbours. Moreover, their patina of age confers prestige. This variable is not linear, however: plurality ethnic groups formed in the period between 0 and 1100 A.D.
are associated with highly homogeneous states while ancient plurality groups and those formed after 1100 are located in more diverse ones. In terms of historical factors, this study corroborates the claims of Nunn (2008) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that African states with a history of slave exports are more fractionalized than other countries. There is modest evidence that a late transition to agriculture is associated with greater ethnic fractionalization.
Most modern economic and political variables are not associated with ethnic fractionalization. Cross-national differences in urbanization, health and income had little or no predictive power. Of all modernization variables, only the founding date of the modern The global coverage of the large-scale Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), while imperfect, will eventually furnish a global database to conduct time-series ethnic fractionalization research. Meanwhile innovative historical approaches, such as those utilizing sub-state census data for one or more countries (Urdal 2008) or providing fractionalization data at two time points (Roeder 2011; Green 2013) offer new pathways toward understanding the temporal aspects of this phenomenon.
There is a less theoretically-classifiable input into fractionalization from international factors. Ethnic diversity tends to decrease when state and ethnic boundaries converge, and vice-versa. This can occur as a) the number of political units increases and/or b) ethnicity and politics come into closer alignment through secession and partition. States which experienced secessions are no more homogeneous than others in the data and those with historic dominant minorities are not more fractionalized. However, the data shows that states formed through ethnically-defined national self-determination movements are more homogeneous than more 'civic' states originating on the basis of ideology or Great Power machinations. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
